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Bantu in the Bathroom 
Jacqueline Rose on the trial  
of Oscar Pistorius 
On 3 March 2014, the first day in the trial of Oscar Pistorius for the killing of Reeva Steenkamp, Judge 
Thokozile Matilda Masipa made her way 
across courtroom GD at North Guateng 
High Court in Pretoria slowly and halting­
ly. She suffers from severe arthritis and for 
the duration of the trial she sat on an ortho­
paedic chair, much smaller than the vast 
leather seats of the two assessors on either 
side. Judge Masipa’s entry couldn’t have 
been more different from that of the de­
fendant she was there to judge. According 
to one observer, Pistorius ‘strode’ up to the 
dock. ‘I execute each stride with intent’ is 
one line of a verse from Corinthians that 
Pistorius has tattooed across his shoulder. 
Depending on your opinion of her final 
judgment, Judge Masipa was either unique­
ly qualified for or unsuited to her task. As 
is well known, she found Pistorius not 
guilty of murder but guilty of culpable hom­
icide – the equivalent of manslaughter in 
Anglo­ American law. After the judgment, 
she became the target of misogynistic and 
patron ising vitriol; she was called ‘an in­
competent black woman’, taunted with be­
ing ‘blind and deaf ’, and required round­
the­clock house protection. Many of those 
accusing her spoke in the name of justice for 
women. The appeal against her verdict was 
heard before South Africa’s supreme court 
last week, and a finding is expected soon.
Judge Masipa is a latecomer to the law, 
having undertaken her pupillage in her 
forties. Admitted as an advocate in 1991 as 
one of only three black women at the Johan­
nesburg bar, she was appointed judge in 
the Transvaal Provincial Division of the 
High Court of South Africa in 1998, the 
second black woman to be appointed to the 
bench. Despite her ruling in the Pistorius 
case Judge Masipa is known for the max­
imum sentences she metes out in cases in­
volving violence against women. In 2009 
she gave a life sentence to a police officer 
who had shot and killed his estranged wife: 
‘You deserve to go to jail for life,’ she said 
in her sentencing, ‘because you are not a 
protect or, you are a killer.’ In May 2013 she 
sentenced a serial rapist to 252 years – 15 
years on each of 11 counts of robbery, 12 
years for attempted murder and life sent­
ences for each of three rape charges. Judge 
Masipa knows about violence. She was born 
in Soweto, in a family of ten children, four 
of whom died young, one of them stabbed 
to death by unknown perpetrators when he 
was 21.  
As with many characters in this story, 
2   6 November 2015
Judge Masipa’s life has followed violence 
from apartheid to its aftermath, and is re­
vealing of the reality of South Africa’s hid­
den and unhidden crimes. She has, as one 
could say, done her time. She knows what it 
means to be on the wrong side of the law 
(even if the law itself in apartheid South 
Africa was wrong). In the 1970s she was a 
crime reporter for the World, a paper ban­
ned in 1977 by the justice minister Jimmy 
Kruger, and then for the white­owned 
newspaper the Post. There, she marched in 
protest with female colleagues against the 
arrest of black male reporters. When five of 
the women, including Masipa, were detain­
ed, locked in a cell and taken to court, they 
refused to enter a plea on the grounds that 
they didn’t recognise the authority of the 
apartheid state. Before releasing the prison­
ers for a court appearance, four white court 
wardens demanded they clean out their 
toilets – shoving their faces in it, as one 
might say (they refused).  
Judge Masipa is ‘compassionate’ – her 
word. She brings her history, the racial hist­
ory of South Africa, into court. You look at 
the law, she said in one interview, ‘with dif­
ferent eyes . . . because you’re compassion­
ate’. If a black woman is on trial, she con­
tinued, ‘you might make things easier for 
her by explaining things and not being too 
hard on her. But not everyone understands 
that.’ Not everyone understands the racial­
ly inflected care which, as one of South 
Africa’s first black women judges, Masipa 
has brought to the law. In another of her 
judgments she found in favour of a group 
of Johannesburg squatters on the grounds 
that the city had failed in its duty of care: 
the city, she said, was trying to ‘distance 
itself ’ from the squatters. ‘I sort of can 
identify with what these youngsters are 
going through,’ she has said of the young 
offenders who have passed through her 
court, ‘because this is where I come from.’ 
Just how remarkable this statement is can 
be gauged when you compare it with the in­
struction given by Susan Shabangu, min­
ist er of mines at the time of the 2012 Mari­
kana mine massacre, to a meeting of police 
officers on the subject of how to deal with 
offenders: ‘You must kill the bastards if 
they threaten you or your community. You 
must not worry about the regulations. That 
is my responsibility.’ 
Some have argued that Masipa’s com­
passion clouded her judgment: that she em­
pathised too closely with Pistorius and his 
disability. Like a psychoanalyst, she should 
have put her empathy, her preferences, 
even her own history to one side (though it 
is arguable whether this is what a psycho­
analyst can, or should, do). Throughout the 
trial, Masipa’s voice was steady, unlike that 
of the defendant, who fell apart and broke 
down at every turn. But what does it mean 
to talk of the still, calm voice of the law in 
conditions of rampant racial and sexual 
violence and inequality? 
Every four minutes in South Africa a woman or a girl – often a teen­ager, sometimes a child – is reported 
raped and every eight hours a woman is 
killed by her partner. The phenomenon has 
a name in South Africa: ‘intimate femicide’, 
or, as the journalist and crime writer Margie 
Orford calls the repeated killing of women 
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across the country, ‘serial femicide’. On 2 
February 2013, less than two weeks before 
Reeva Steenkamp was killed, a 17­year­old 
girl, Anene Booysen, was raped and murd­
ered in Western Cape. If the two deaths are 
mentioned together it is mostly in terms of 
the cruel disparity between the neglected 
black woman’s body and that of her glam­
orous white counterpart. Steenkamp saw 
things rather differently. For her, violence 
against women knew no racial bounds. A 
week after Booysen’s murder, she retweet­
ed a report of her funeral, and posted on 
her Instagram feed a graphic of a man’s 
hand silencing a screaming woman with 
the words: ‘I woke up in a happy safe home 
this morning. Not everyone did. Speak out 
against the rape of individ uals.’ The day be­
fore she died she was polishing a speech 
to be delivered at a school in Johannesburg 
in honour of Anene Booyson and in sup­
port of the Black Friday campaign for Rape 
Awareness.  
In the final year of her law degree, Steen­
kamp broke her back in a riding accident. 
On recovery, she returned to complete her 
degree and resolved to pursue her dream of 
becoming a model in the big city. ‘I be­
lieve,’ she said in an interview, ‘I have the 
ability to fall back into my legal mind under 
the pressure of my will to succeed.’ Her leg­
al mind would always be there, even if on 
the surface she would start to look like and 
then be treated as a model and nothing 
else. The law would become the invisible 
companion of her ambition, the joint ri­
poste to a life that could have been – nearly 
was – spent in a wheelchair. This wasn’t her 
first brush with brokenness. According to 
her cousin Kim Martin, who spoke at Pistor­
ius’s sentencing (the only time during the 
whole trial that the Steenkamp family got a 
hearing), when Reeva was a young girl the 
family’s pet poodle became paralysed and 
was going to have to be put down. Reeva 
saved the dog, ‘became its legs’, as Martin 
put it, carrying the animal everywhere. 
Was Steenkamp prey to a fatal identific­
ation? Did her compassion for the under­
dog – ‘underdog’ literally in this case – play 
its part in what killed her? One of the 
most striking things about this trial is that 
wherever you look you see bodies that are 
brok en. Near the end of the trial, before 
the closing arguments, Pistorius’s older 
brother, Carl, was involved in a head­on car 
collision which crushed both his legs be­
low the knee – the link to his brother was 
glaring – leaving it unclear whether he 
would live or ever walk again. In fact, he re­
covered speedily enough to make it into 
the courtroom in a wheelchair in time for 
the  verdict.  
Judge, victim, perpetrator: the lines of 
the case couldn’t be more clearly drawn. It 
was never in question that Oscar Pistorius 
had fired the four shots that killed Reeva 
Steenkamp. He had. In Masipa’s account 
the question was entirely ‘subjective’. What 
was going on inside the mind of Pistorius 
when he shot through the bathroom door? 
Everything hung on that question. Did he 
know he was shooting Reeva Steenkamp? 
Or did he believe it was an intruder, as he 
claimed more or less from the moment it 
happened, including to the friends and the 
police who were the first at the scene of the 
crime? And if we believe him, then did he 
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know he might kill the person on the other 
side of the door and shoot anyway? In 
Masipa’s words, ‘Did the accused foresee 
the possibility of the resultant death and 
yet persisted in his deed reckless whether 
death ensued or not?’ If he did, he would be 
guilty of what South African law calls dolus 
eventualis, a category of criminal intent that 
falls short of premeditation but which still 
implies murder because the possibility of 
death is foreseen. The lesser charge of 
culp able homicide, killing through neglig­
ence, of which Pistorius was found guilty, 
stands only if we agree it can’t be proved 
that Pistorius knew his bullets might kill. 
Masipa’s dismissal of the charge of dolus 
eventualis is at the heart of the legal disputes 
around her verdict and was the basis for the 
current appeal.
I happened to be in Cape Town a week after the killing of Reeva Steenkamp. At the time I was reading A Bantu in 
My Bathroom, a book of essays by Eusebius 
McKaiser, a South African political and soc­
ial theorist and radio talk show host. He is 
known for being provocative and likes to 
challenge South Africans to confront their 
darkest thoughts. (His collection is sub­
titled ‘Debating Race, Sexuality and Other 
Uncomfortable South African Topics’.) In 
2012, 18 years after the end of apartheid, 
he was looking for a room to rent and light­
ed on an advertisement from a woman will­
ing to share her house but only, the ad stip­
ulated, with a white person. On the phone, 
McKaiser got her almost to the point of 
sealing the deal before announcing that he 
wasn’t white (she hung up when he sug­
gested her choice might be racist). When 
he related the incident to the audience of 
his weekly radio programme, Politics and 
Morality on Talk Radio 702, two responses 
predominated. Either the listeners sided 
with the owner of the house (her property, 
her preference, no different from ‘only 
non­smokers need apply’), or they made a 
more subtle but disquieting distinction: if 
the room was in a cottage in her backyard, 
the choice would be racist, but she clearly 
had the right to share her house, or not, 
with whomever she pleased.  
‘Reasonable’ as the second preference 
might seem, McKaiser concedes in his 
essay, it is still ‘morally odious’, still ‘the 
product of our racist past’. ‘This viewpoint,’ 
he elaborates, 
is an acknowledgment (indeed, an express­
ion) of a deep racial angst. Why else would 
you be fine with Sipho [the name McKaiser 
gives the fictional black tenant] sleeping in 
the flat outside but heaven forbid that you 
should wake up in the morning and the first 
thing you see on your way to the bathroom is 
the heart attack­inducing spectacle of Sipho 
smiling at you, a horror that just might elicit 
a scream of apartheid proportions: ‘Help! 
There is a Bantu in my bathroom!’ 
‘Not one listener,’ McKaiser writes, ‘grap­
pled with how it is that 18 years after our 
democratic journey . . . racialism’s reach 
and endurance inside their homes and 
hearts dare not be spoken about.’ Not one 
avoided the cliché – indeed they all re­
hearsed it to perfection – that your private 
life is private and it is up to you what you 
do in your own home (a cliché whose pot­
entially lethal consequences were of course 
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long ago dismantled by feminism). In fail­
ing to do so, they ‘betrayed dark secrets 
about themselves and our country’. In an­
other essay McKaiser refers to the Coloureds 
of Cape Town – he himself is a Coloured – 
as ‘the dirty little secret’ of the city: ‘Cape 
Town, you see, treats Coloured people like 
dirt.’ ‘The dirty secrets of both Jozi [Johan­
nesburg] and Cape Town are a stain on 
both cities’ images, like mud on a kid’s new 
white pants.’  
It soon became clear that a strange,  racially charged and legally confused distinction would be at the heart of the 
trial. If Pistorius didn’t fire the shots 
through the toilet door in the knowledge 
that Steenkamp was inside, then he be­
lieved he was shooting at an intruder, in 
which case the charge of premeditated 
murder wouldn’t hold up. There was no 
doubt that the second possibility was seen 
– or rather would be presented by Barry 
Roux for the defence – as the lesser offence, 
and not just because the legal category of 
‘putative private defence’ (defending one­
self against a presumed attacker, even if the 
presumption was wrong) could present the 
shooting as a legitimate response to fear. 
What was largely unspoken was that in the 
second case we can be more or less certain 
that the person killed in the bathroom 
would be – could only be – imagined as 
black. ‘As the judge will not have failed to 
register,’ the journalist John Carlin writes 
in Chase Your Shadow: The Trials of Oscar Pist­
orius, ‘if his story were true – and even if it 
were not – the faceless intruder of his imag­
ination had to have had a black face, be­
cause the fact was that for white people 
crime mostly did have a black face.’1 
 Margie Orford was one of the few to 
draw out the racist implications. ‘It is,’ she 
wrote in an article for South Africa’s Sunday 
Times, ‘the threatening body, nameless and 
faceless, of an armed and dangerous black 
intruder . . . the contemporary version of 
the laager’; it is ‘nothing more than the re­
claiming of the old white fear of the swart 
gevaar’ – the black peril. For Orford, there is 
something profoundly amiss – morally, for 
sure, and perhaps legally – if this is Pistor­
ius’s main defence. ‘If Pistorius was not 
shooting to kill the woman with whom he 
had just been sharing a bed,’ she continues, 
‘those four bullets indicate that there is still 
no middle ground. Because whoever Pist­
orius thought was behind that door, firing 
at such close range meant that when he 
finished there would be a body on that 
bathroom floor.’ A Bantu in the bathroom. 
Or to elaborate McKaiser’s point: in the 
white racist imagination, the only Bantu 
permitted in a white bathroom is a Bantu 
who is dead. Depending on how you look 
at it, the killing of Reeva Steenkamp was 
either a sex crime or a race crime.  
If Orford’s reasoning is correct, what 
this also means is that the charge of dolus 
eventualis – proceeding with a violent act in 
the knowledge that death might ensue – 
would stand (Pistorius would be guilty of 
murder). In fact, Masipa’s dismissal of the 
charge of dolus hangs on a distinction she 
herself is not quite able to make: ‘How,’ she 
asks in her judgment, ‘could the accused 
reasonably have foreseen that the shots he 
fired would kill the deceased? Clearly he did 
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not subjectively foresee this as a possibility 
that he would kill the person behind the 
door, let alone the deceased, as he thought 
she was in the bedroom at the time.’ For me 
the issue here is not that she chooses to be­
lieve his claim that he thought Steenkamp 
was still in bed – as she rightly points out in 
law, the contrary can’t be proved. Rather it 
is the slippage between intruder and Steen­
kamp that is for me the giveaway: it is in­
deed clear that he couldn’t have foreseen 
that he might kill Steenkamp if ‘he thought 
she was in the bedroom at the time,’ but 
how can that also apply to ‘the person be­
hind the door’, whoever it was, given that 
he was shooting at that door with a 9mm 
handgun? According to Masipa, however, if 
he didn’t know he was killing Steenkamp 
then he wasn’t guilty of murder, regardless 
of who might have been in the bathroom. 
The bantu slips syntactically under the 
bathroom door.  
Eusebius McKaiser’s essay set me thinking about the trial – and about bathrooms – in the context of South 
Africa’s past. Under apartheid law, the 
rules for white private residences were ex­
plicit: servants’ quarters had to be across 
the yard, ‘mean little rooms with a sink and 
a toilet’. No shared walls between white 
master and black servant, above all no 
shared ablution facilities across racial 
lines, which suggests that, for apartheid, it 
is above all the races’ body fluids and mat­
ter that must not mix, especially if you also 
bear in mind apartheid’s ban on cross­ 
racial sexual intercourse – a ban that is far 
better known, probably because it is eas­
ier, as in cleaner, to talk about. McKaiser’s 
fastidious respondents, who consider a 
white racist’s bathroom preferences no 
more than a matter of personal liking and 
etiq uette, are therefore enacting a form of 
memory as buried as it is historically pre­
cise. The white world, the South African 
journalist Mark Gevisser writes in his mem­
oir Lost and Found in Johannesburg, was de­
fined ‘by what it had been walled against’.2 
To illustrate the insane lengths to which 
this project could be taken, Gevisser gives 
the example of the ten­foot­high fence 
built by the apartheid authorities across the 
rocky promontory off the shore of Johan­
nesburg where gays of different races would 
congregate in the 1960s. To make sure that 
Coloureds couldn’t cross into the white 
residences at Clifton where his family lived, 
they extended the fence twenty feet into 
the Atlantic Ocean. 
There is a politics of water and there is 
a politics of shit. In the black township of 
Alexandra, where there was no sewage, re­
sidents had to leave their shit outside their 
doors every night for collection (the basis 
of a protest poem by Wally Serote – ‘What’s 
in This Black “Shit”?’). All the more re­
markable, then, as Gevisser observes, were 
those who carried their anti­apartheid 
struggle not just into the privacy of their 
homes, but into the water, allowing bodies 
to swim, touch and mix against the brute, 
squeamish hand of the law. There was 
Bram Fischer’s pool on Beaumont Street, 
legendary for its parties of blacks and 
whites, photographed lovingly by Drum 
magazine in the 1960s, when Fischer was 
presenting the concluding arguments in 
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the famous Treason Trial of 156 members 
of the ANC. And the home offered by one of 
Gevisser’s acquaintances, Roger, and his 
black lover, for the use of interracial gays, a 
house protected from the prying eyes of 
the law by soaring cypresses, where the 
bath was always filled so you could wash off 
someone else’s bodily fluids if there was 
a raid. The Pistorius trial, Gevisser writes, 
‘coursed through the electoral season like a 
foul river carrying the country’s legacies of 
fear and violence on its currents’. The ana­
logy is eloquent. Like a foul river, bringing 
pestilence, the killing in the bathroom 
both enacted and drew to the surface of 
the national psyche its deepest racial fears. 
‘What,’ Orford asks, is this ‘irrational fear 
that has sunk deep in to the psyche’? Or in 
McKaiser’s words, ‘mud on a kid’s new 
white pants’. 
Pistorius was surely not aware, at least 
not consciously, that, when he insisted the 
person he shot in the bathroom was an in­
truder, he was re­enacting one strand of his 
nation’s cruellest past. Some excuse, we 
might say. At the very least, even if this 
defence stands, he can hardly be held to be 
innocent. As Margie Orford says, ‘whoever 
Pistorius thought was behind that door, 
firing at such close range meant that when 
he finished there would be a body on that 
bathroom floor.’ Pistorius’s gun was loaded 
with Black Talon expanding bullets, which 
mushroom on striking human tissue: as 
Mandy Weiner and Barry Bateman point 
out in their book on the case, ‘killer ammun­
ition designed to cause as much damage to 
the target as possible’.3 
So did Pistorius know that it was Steen­kamp in the toilet? It is here that we move into the realm of speculation 
and dream, where the law hits the buffer 
of what is at once screaming out for our 
attention and cannot be known. When I 
suggested to the writer Rachel Holmes, 
for decades my main informant on South 
Africa, that this was a case where knowing 
and not­knowing collide – we know he 
knew it was Steenkamp in the toilet, only of 
course we don’t, we can think we know but 
our knowing has its limits; our knowledge, 
we could say, is not flush with our desire – 
she suggested that the correct and far 
simpler distinction in this case is between 
knowing and having no proof. Legally she 
is of course right, as Masipa dismissed the 
charge of premeditated murder on the 
grounds that his intention to kill Steen­
kamp had not been proved beyond reason­
able doubt. But, whichever way you read it, 
it is clear that, in Masipa’s words, ‘there are 
a number of aspects in the case that do not 
make sense.’ In her judgment she then list­
ed a series of questions which, she stated, 
would ‘unfortunately remain a matter for 
conjecture’. Why, when Pistorius heard the 
bathroom window opening, as he claimed, 
did he  
not ascertain from the deceased, when he 
heard the window open, whether she too had 
heard anything? Why did he not ascertain 
whether the deceased had heard him since he 
did not get a response from the deceased be­
fore making his way to the bathroom? Why 
did the deceased, in the toilet and only a few 
metres away from the accused, not commun­
icate with the accused, or phone the police as 
requested by the accused? 
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‘It makes no sense,’ Masipa observed, to 
say she did not hear him scream ‘Get out,’ 
since ‘it was the accused’s version that he 
screamed on top of his voice.’ Why did the 
accused fire not one but four shots before 
he ran back to the bedroom to try to find 
the deceased? To which we can add the 
questions of Gerrie Nel, leading for the 
prosecution, and those of the judge at the 
original bail hearing. Why would someone 
who slept with a firearm under his bed, and 
was apparently fearful of crime, fall asleep 
with a sliding door to the balcony wide 
open? Although Pistorius claimed he had 
been the victim of violence and burglaries, 
there was no police record of his ever open­
ing a case where he was the victim of a 
crime. Why did he not see that Steenkamp 
wasn’t in the bed at the time he unholster­
ed his weapon? Why did the accused not 
ascertain the whereabouts of his girlfriend 
when he got out of bed? Why did he not 
even try to find out who exactly was in the 
toilet?  
None of these questions was ever fully 
answered (though Pistorius’s defence work­
ed hard to take them down one by one). 
The police who arrived on the scene made 
no bones about the fact they believed the 
intruder story to be fake. The story doesn’t 
make sense, as Masipa conceded, even 
while arguing that Pistorius’s confused, 
contradictory, evasive and unreliable test­
imony was not in itself a proof of guilt. Pist­
orius’s former girlfriend, Samantha Taylor, 
put it most simply: ‘It definitely didn’t 
make sense to me. I would . . . I don’t know, 
I find that kind of weird, I definitely 
wouldn’t close the door, especially if it’s not 
even connected to the bedroom. I don’t 
know why someone would lock the door, 
even if they are at their boyfriend’s house.’ 
Her comments have all the force of high­
risk empathy: she is willing to imagine 
herself where she might have ended up – in 
Reeva Steenkamp’s place. 
For anyone who reads this killing 
through the prism of domestic violence, 
and on behalf of the legions of women who 
have been its target, one question surely 
stands out from all the rest. Why – as Pist­
orius always insisted – did Steenkamp not 
speak or cry out, not from the bedroom if 
that is where she was, or from the toilet? 
Why, the whole time he was screaming, 
even when he was in the bathroom, did 
she not utter a word? This is Pistorius in his 
final statement: ‘I got to the entrance of the 
bathroom, at the end of the passage, where 
I stopped screaming . . . At this point I 
started screaming again for Reeva to phone 
the police . . . I kept on screaming . . . I 
shouted for Reeva . . . I kept on shouting for 
Reeva.’ Why didn’t she answer or call out? 
A dead woman becomes a silent witness in 
the courtroom, voiceless now, voiceless 
then. Twice over, Pistorius silenced Reeva 
Steenkamp, turned her into a ghost. 
This question of voice produced one of 
the most extraordinary and unanticipated 
turns of the trial. Four neighbours – Estelle 
van der Merwe, Johan Stipp, Michele Burg­
er and her husband Charl Johnson – test­
ified that they heard the unmistakeable 
voice of a woman before the shots were 
fired: a woman, more than one of them 
insisted, who sounded as if she feared for 
her life. On the witness stand, each of 
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them was adamant that the voice of the per­
son ‘screaming hysterically’ was a woman’s 
voice. Their testimony was finally dismiss­
ed as inconclusive (largely owing to in­
consist encies in timing). The argument for 
the defence was that the cries they heard 
came after, not before, the fatal shots were 
fired, and were those of Pistorius as what 
he had done dawned on him: establishing 
the timeline between screaming and shoot­
ing was crucial to the argument, as was the 
assertion that Steenkamp would have been 
so badly – probably fatally – wounded after 
the first shot that she would have been in­
capable of making any sound.  
Masipa didn’t seem to register the fact 
that Pistorius’s own claim that he was 
screaming ‘on top of his voice’ as he made 
his way along the corridor towards the 
bathroom was inconsistent with the de­
fence’s argument that the cries heard by the 
witnesses came after the shots were fired: 
‘It was the accused’s version that he 
screamed on top of his voice, when order­
ing the intruders to get out.’ When you read 
Pistorius’s statement it seems pretty clear 
that his repeated insistence that he was 
shouting out was his means – under legal 
instruction, no doubt – of countering the 
witnesses who claimed to have heard a 
woman’s screaming voice before the shots 
were fired.  
But if there was screaming before the 
shots, how to see off the charge that it 
could have been her voice? At this point the 
trial suddenly turned on its head the per­
fect heterosexual narrative which accounts 
for so much of the seductive pull of this 
case. When he screams, the defence claim­
ed, Oscar Pistorius – blade runner, stud, 
hero – sounds like a woman. At one point, 
in support of this argument, Roux asked 
two female witnesses to demonstrate 
 the crying they had heard: unsurprisingly, 
they sounded like women (he didn’t re­
peat  the experiment with any of the male 
witnesses, who presumably would have 
sounded like men). He also announced 
that decibel tests and an expert witness 
would establish that when Pistorius is anx­
ious, he screams like a woman. In fact no 
such testimony was ever laid before the 
court and no audio of Pistorius screaming 
was ever played. Samantha Taylor testified 
that when Pistorius screamed ‘it sounded 
like a man,’ but Roux dismissed her evid­
ence on the grounds that she had never 
heard him in situations where he perceived 
his life to be in danger, which she had to 
concede.  
Better to sound like a woman than to 
have murdered one. Better a cross­gender 
identification than a killing masculinity 
(on that much, feminism, and not only 
feminism, would surely agree). To save his 
skin, Oscar Pistorius ventriloquised a 
woman, or was led by his legal team to do 
so. He took her place. Behind what might 
be seen as a moment of unanticipated and 
welcome gender confusion – since gender 
confusion is always, or nearly always, to be 
welcomed – we might also, or rather, see a 
man going to the furthest lengths he can 
go, including sacrificing the image of him­
self as a man, to make absolutely sure that 
no one hears the voice of a woman crying 
out in fear for her life.  
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Gender trouble has become one of the theoretical mantras of our time. But there are forms of 
gender uncertainty which add insult to in­
jury and one of the most glaring instances 
I have come across was on display at this 
trial.  We  know that for the ANC women 
protesting outside the court and for wom­
en the world over, this case bore the unmis­
takeable signs of lethal domestic violence 
(even if Steenkamp and Pistorius did not 
strictly share a home). We know that what 
often appears to be, indeed might be, the 
most intimate, loving relationship can fail 
to protect women. We know that passion­
ate attachment can involve hatred, that, as 
many women discover too late, sex is often 
the bedfellow of crime – though I am not a 
feminist who believes that all men, simply 
by dint of being men, are violent towards 
women. We also note, as Suzanne Moore 
pointed out, that Pistorius got less for kill­
ing Reeva Steenkamp than he would have 
got for killing a rhino: a poacher was rec­
ently sentened to 77 years’ imprisonment; 
Pistorius was sentenced to five years with 
parole possible after ten months (in the 
event he served 12).  
But the fact that this was a case where a 
man had killed his girlfriend didn’t stop the 
defence from arguing – incredibly – that 
when Pistorius shot through that door he 
himself could best be understood, because 
of his disability, by being compared with an 
abused woman, who, after years of press­
ure, finally snaps and kills her abuser. 
When, as one would expect, the analogy 
was challenged by Masipa – ‘How does [the 
situation of an abused woman] apply to the 
accused in this case?’ – Roux, as I see it, 
only makes matters worse:
I am not talking about abuse here. You know 
I cannot run away. I cannot run away. I do not 
have a flight response . . . His experience with 
that disability, over time you get an exagger­
ated fight response . . . That is the ‘slow burn’ 
effect. Not abuse . . . That constant reminder 
. . . I am not the same . . . He can pretend . . . 
he can pretend that he is fine  . . . because of 
the anxiety . . . it is in that sense that I say the 
abuse is different, but it is the same. Without 
legs, abuse, abuse, abuse. So ultimately when 
that woman picks up that firearm . . . we can 
use the common word, I have had enough, I 
am not shooting you because you have just 
assaulted me, not because of one punch with 
a fist in my face. I would never have shot you 
because of one punch with a fist in my face, 
but if you have done it sixty, seventy times, 
that effect of that over time it filled the cup to 
the brim that is . . . in that sense, My Lady. 
So Pistorius doesn’t just sound like a 
woman, he is a woman. This almost defies 
comment but not quite. This claim yet 
again to be speaking in a woman’s voice – ‘I 
have had enough’ – the voice of a woman 
who, we are to imagine, has just been, for 
the sixtieth or seventieth time, the target of 
physical abuse – while clearly beyond the 
pale, might at the same time be read as a 
veiled confession, an unconscious acknowl­
edgment by the defence of the very version 
of the story they are exerting their utmost 
to repudiate: that this is a case of a man en­
acting violence against a woman, a woman 
who (if statements by Steenkamp’s friends 
and family are anything to go by) had had 
enough. 
Here is part of a 516­word WhatsApp 
11   6 November 2015
message Steenkamp sent Pistorius 18 days 
before she died, as read out in court in one 
of the few moments when her own words 
were heard: ‘You have picked on me in­
cessantly since you got back from CT and I 
understand that you are sick but it’s nasty 
. . . I am scared of U sometimes and how 
you snap at me and of how U will react 
to me . . . I am not some other bitch you 
may know, trying to kill your vibe.’ ‘Normal 
relationships,’ Masipa commented in her 
judg ment, ‘are dynamic and unpredictable 
most of the time, while human beings are 
fickle. Neither the evidence of a loving re­
lationship, nor of a relationship turned 
sour can assist this court to determine 
whether the accused had the requisite in­
tention to kill the deceased. For that reason 
the court refrains from making inferences 
one way or another in this regard.’ Again 
she is right – certainly about relationships. 
Yet for me this is perhaps the darkest 
moment in the judgment, when the law, 
when a woman judge, fails to give due 
weight to another woman, one who didn’t 
survive. I don’t believe that all women are at 
risk from all men but I do believe that a 
woman doesn’t say she is scared of a man 
without cause and that when she does we 
must listen. It is the fear in the future tense 
– ‘I am scared of you sometimes . . . and of 
how you will react to me’ – that, for me, 
most loudly calls for our attention. 
None of which excludes the presence of 
love, as any abused woman will testify (her 
fear isn’t incompatible with her leaving him 
a Valentine’s card). For the same reason, 
Pistorius’s grief at Steenkamp’s death – 
which must include the repeated moments 
of his weeping, retching and vomiting in 
the courtroom – surely can’t be taken as 
proof that he lacked the requisite intent to 
kill her. As if guilt can’t intensify grief, as if 
you can’t regret with all your heart what was 
your most fervent wish only seconds ago, 
as if love and murderousness are incompat­
ible. But Masipa argued instead that Pist­
orius’s grief would have to be fake if he had 
wanted to kill his girlfriend, which it clear­
ly wasn’t – one moment in the proceedings 
where we badly needed Freud. Here is an­
other. Interrogated by Nel as to why he 
thought Steenkamp didn’t cry out, Pistor­
ius replied: ‘I presume that she would think 
that the danger was coming closer to her. 
So why will she shout out?’ Another veiled 
confession – though the moment appears 
to have received no commentary – in which 
Pistorius, trying to wriggle out of one cor­
ner (why did she not cry out?), lands him­
self in another by correctly, if unintention­
ally, identifying himself as the approaching 
danger against which Steenkamp was pro­
tecting herself (‘the danger was coming 
closer’). And another: cross­examined by 
Nel on why he was screaming after firing 
the shots, Pistorius said, ‘I wanted to ask 
Reeva why she was phoning the police.’ 
Amazingly, this choice of wording – ‘why 
she was phoning the police’ – wasn’t picked 
up by the prosecution or anyone else.
Sex, race, disability, and that’s not all, even if it’s more than enough. So let’s return to Roux’s comment: ‘He can 
pretend that he is fine.’ Pistorius and Steen­
kamp were of course the perfect couple. 
They both honed their bodies. On her left 
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ankle, Steenkamp had a tattoo of the word 
‘Lioness’ (she was a Leo), which she ex­
plained on Twitter: ‘Abundance and power 
are yours, for you are the lioness.’ She had 
trained herself to ‘flawless super­fitness’, 
Hagen Engler, edit or of FHM magazine, re­
called in a column days after she was killed. 
The full citation from Corinthians tattooed 
on Pistorius’s upper back reads:  
I do not run like a man running aimlessly; 
I do not fight like a man beating the air; 
I execute each stride with intent; 
I beat my body and make it my slave 
I bring it under my complete subjection 
To keep myself from being disqualified 
After having called others to the contest. 
The line about making my body my slave is 
not in most translations from Corinthians, 
nor is subjection described as ‘complete’. 
Pistorius was raising the stakes. He was 
also punishing, or even indicting, himself. 
‘To keep myself from being disqualified’ is 
also telling. In 2007, Pistorius was under 
investigation by the International Assoc­
iation of Athletics Federations to determine 
whether his prosthesis gave him an unfair 
competitive advantage. (He eventually won 
his case and was allowed to compete in the 
Beijing Olympics in 2008.) The lessons his 
mother imparted to him, John Carlin ob­
serves in his book, commenting on an 
 inter view he conducted with Bill Schroeder, 
headmaster of Pretoria Boys School, ‘all 
boiled down to the same thing . . . to run as 
fast as he could’. We don’t need Freud’s 
help to perceive the ambiguity and weight 
of that demand, a demand which he then 
made, unerringly, of himself: running as fast 
as he could as in winning, but also fleeing, 
running away. Schroeder recalls that when 
he tentatively asked Pistorius’s mother about 
her 13­year­old son, ‘But . . . is he going to 
cope?’, referring to his pro sthetic legs, she 
exchanged glances with her son and shrug­
ged, ‘I don’t think I follow. What are you 
saying?’ and then observed: ‘There’s no 
problem at all. He’s absolutely normal.’ On 
the first page of his auto biography, written 
before the killing of Steenkamp, Pistorius 
explains the attitude integral to his family’s 
philosophy: ‘This is Oscar Pistorius, exact­
ly as he should be. Perfect in himself.’ In 
fact his mother was a depressive who died 
of alcohol poisoning when Pistorius was 15. 
As Carlin points out, Pistorius said ‘my 
mother’ more often than anything else in 
his testimony. (Like his mother, Pistorius 
slept with a firearm under his pillow.) 
Many people involved in disability studies 
would hold that Sheila Pistorius’s descript­
ion of her son, and the Pistorius family 
phil osophy, is correct, that all bodies are 
as they ‘should be’. In Britain today, with 
a government whose reasserted harshness 
towards disability seems to know no limits, 
it may be more important to insist on this 
than ever before. As Cora Kaplan observed 
15 years ago, the discourse of fiscal respons­
ibility in both the US and UK has long 
had disability in its sights as an intoler­
able economic burden on ‘normal’ citizenry. 
Sheila Pistorius’s ‘he’s absolutely normal’ 
could be read as a necessary riposte. The 
only response to bureaucratic inhumanity 
must be to argue that need or frailty must 
be recognised, but so must the dignity – in­
deed ‘normality’ – of the disabled. We are 
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talking about justice and human rights, 
which are the terms in which recent disabil­
ity studies defines its task. But this is some­
thing of a double bind. When you insist on 
dignity and normality the risk is that both 
physical and psychic suffering become in­
visible, denied, and then have to deny 
themselves (‘he is perfect’). Worse, such a 
denial veers dangerously close to the repud­
iation of weakness and suffering that has 
historically licensed the sometimes geno­
cidal cruelty directed towards the disabled: 
because you suffer, because we have to see 
your suffering, we will not suffer you. The 
poet and critic Nancy Mairs, who was 
struck down with multiple sclerosis at the 
age of 28, made the strongest alternative 
case in her 1986 essay ‘On Being a Cripple’ 
(now an unspeakable word but one which 
she reclaimed for herself ): ‘Society,’ she 
wrote, ‘is no readier to accept crippledness 
than to accept death, war, sex, sweat or 
disease.’ For Mairs it is emancipatory not 
oppressive, and the opposite of inhuman, 
to speak openly of a body that fails.  
Merryll Vorster, the forensic psychiatrist 
called by the defence, was in no doubt that 
the amputation of both of Pistorius’s limbs 
as a pre­verbal child, before he was one, 
would have been experienced as a traum­
atic assault, that the family attitude had 
meant he was never allowed to see himself 
as disabled, and that this had a significant 
detrimental impact on his development: 
‘By concealing his disability, this rendered 
him less able to access the emot ional sup­
port he required.’ In a vicious cycle, she 
argued, his physical vulnerability made him 
more anxious, which then made him more 
intent on concealing his physical vulner­
ability from the world. We could say that 
his disability became the encrypted secret 
of his body and his life.  
When the prosecution saw that Vorster’s 
comments might lead to a defence based 
on Generalised Anxiety Disorder, Nel im­
mediately demanded that Pistorius under­
go a full psychiatric assessment. It was a 
moment of high drama, leading to a one­
month suspension of proceedings. Nel had 
taken a risk. Hoping to rule out a possible 
defence for Pistorius, he might instead be 
opening the door to his being acquitted on 
grounds of mental incapacity. When the 
court reconvened, however, the decision 
was unequivocal: Pistorius suffered no 
form of mental debility, showed no lack of 
criminal capacity; there was nothing to 
prevent his knowing the consequences of 
his act or distinguishing between right and 
wrong. ‘There was,’ Masipa remarked in 
her judgment, ‘no lapse of memory or any 
confusion on the part of the accused.’ 
The battle in the courtroom was now re­
peating the internal dilemma of Pistorius 
himself, as it split down the middle be­
tween the two ways we have of seeing dis­
ability: Pistorius as crippled and vulner­
able, Pistorius as perfect and empowered. 
If the first, then he shot Reeva Steenkamp 
out of his deep­seated fears; if the second, 
he shot her because his physical prowess, 
and the acclaim that followed, had allowed 
him to nurture the illusion that he ruled the 
world and could take the law into his own 
hands. Ironically, it was the prosecution 
that had to believe unreservedly in Pistor­
ius on his own terms, had – in effect – to 
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side with him. ‘For the prosecution to suc­
ceed,’ Carlin writes, he ‘needed Pistorius to 
be regarded by the judge as he had always 
portrayed himself prior to the trial . . . Nel 
had to deny the existence of the secretly 
vulnerable and fear­plagued amputee as 
vigorously as the Blade Runner himself had 
sought to do all his life until the night of the 
shooting.’ The defence, in turn, could only 
proceed by ruthlessly dismantling his life­
long, carefully nurtured image of himself: 
‘Without legs, abuse, abuse, abuse.’  
It was therefore the defence that mutilat­
ed Pistorius’s own defences, as it proceed­
ed to uncover his disability in the eyes of 
the world. On two occasions he was obliged 
to reveal his stumps to the courtroom (one 
might also see his weeping, retching and 
vomiting in court as his body spilling over 
its borders and revealing itself ). In fact he 
himself was more than ready to follow this 
line: ‘The discharging of my firearm was 
precipitated by a noise in the toilet which I, 
in my fearful state, knowing that I was on 
my stumps, unable to run away or properly 
defend myself physically, believed to be the 
intruder or intruders, coming out of the 
toilet to attack Reeva and me.’ Note ‘the 
discharging of my firearm was precipitat­
ed’ –  as if the gun had gone off all by itself. 
Banners at the 2012 Olympics read: ‘Para­
lympics. We are the superhumans.’ Not 
cripples but gladiators, as one comment­
ator observed. Pistorius, as the strapline on 
his official website declared, was the ‘bullet 
in the chamber’. Between Pistorius, his 
father, two of his uncles and his grand­
father, his family owned 55 guns. In one 
notorious episode, Pistorius fired through 
the open sunroof of a car after an alter­
cation about his gun with a police officer 
who had pulled the car over for speeding: 
‘You can’t just touch another man’s gun,’ he 
offered by way of explanation for his rage – 
his gun a body part, the most intimate 
piece of himself. Samantha Taylor spoke 
about his gun as a ‘third party’ in their re­
lat ionship. A 9mm Luger bullet sat upright 
on his kitchen counter. At the time of the 
killing, he was waiting to take delivery of 
six firearms, including a semi­automatic of 
the kind used by the South African Police 
Service, and 580 rounds of ammunition.  
There is, again, a history of South Africa to be told here. The Afrikaners conquered the southern tip of Africa 
with guns, a heritage of which, Carlin 
observes, the Pistorius clan was proud. 
In Zakes Mda’s most recent novel, Black 
Diamond, a white magistrate is under threat 
for her crackdown on crime. When she in­
sists to the black protector assigned to her 
that she doesn’t want guns in her house, he 
replies with a smirk on his face: ‘You don’t 
want guns? What kind of Afrikaaner are 
you?’ As Gillian Slovo put it in a lecture at 
the LSE in May, the guns that supported 
and opposed apartheid are still too present 
in South Africa today. Pistorius was fearful 
of crime, but then no white South African, 
indeed no South African, can avoid being 
fearful of crime: robberies in residential 
properties increased by 70 per cent between 
2003 and 2012, although in 90 per cent of 
cases the victims of such burglaries are un­
harmed and it is the poor who are most 
often the victims. In fact, only 5 per cent of 
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South Africans own firearms.  
On this Masipa was unhesitant. Pistor­
ius’s actions couldn’t be justified by his 
fears. ‘I hasten to add that the accused is 
not unique in this respect,’ she said in what 
for me was one of the best moments in her 
judgment. ‘Women, children, the elderly 
and all those with limited ability would fall 
under the same category.’ ‘But,’ she asked, 
‘would it be reasonable if without further 
ado they armed themselves with a firearm if 
threatened with danger? . . . Many have 
been victims of violent crime but they have 
not resorted to sleeping with firearms 
under their pillows.’ Vulnerability is no lic­
ence to violence. You think you are unique 
in this regard. Think again. Disability or 
weakness is something you can suffer, but 
never own. It is no excuse. For that reason 
I’m not persuaded by those who argue that 
Masipa’s sympathy for Pistorius’s disability 
swayed her judgment, though it is surely 
true that she refused to join in the hatred 
directed at him. She is a universalist, moved 
by a compassion that manages at once to be 
specific to South Africa while taking in the 
vulnerable – women, children, the elderly, 
all those with limited ability – everywhere. 
Nor am I convinced that she was above all 
driven by the desire to avoid being seen as 
enacting revenge justice on a rich white 
man (though it is surely the case that, as a 
black judge, she too was on trial).  
Sex, race, disability, what’s left? What’s left is the life of the mind, the limits of knowledge, the psychic and 
political imperative of thought. There are 
guns, and there is thinking. In his test­
imony, Pistorius repeatedly insisted that he 
wasn’t thinking when he fired four shots 
through the door: ‘That split moment I be­
lieved somebody was coming out to attack 
me. That is what made me fire. Out of fear. 
I did not have time to think.’ And: ‘I did not 
shoot at anyone. I did not intend to shoot at 
someone. I shot out of fear . . . I fired my 
firearm before I could think.’ Or, as Masipa 
put it in her summary of what she heard 
him say, ‘I am a gun enthusiast. I did not 
have time to think.’  
But if he didn’t intend to shoot anyone 
and wasn’t thinking, then he can’t rely on 
the argument of putative private defence 
(that he shot in response to a perceived 
threat). If he shot because he thought he 
was in danger of being attacked, then he 
clearly had time to think. Had he wanted to 
kill an intruder, he explains, he would have 
shot higher up towards the chest. ‘I pause 
to state,’ Masipa commented, ‘that this 
assertion is inconsistent with someone who 
shot without thinking.’ Pistorius’s ‘plethora 
of defences’, as Masipa described them, 
obey the logic of the unconscious, each one 
cancelling out the next. He was judged 
partly according to whether his behaviour 
was that of a ‘reasonable person’, but it 
was something beyond reason that the law 
found itself up against. Not thinking doesn’t 
render you innocent, any more than fear 
does. It is in the split second between 
thought and non­thought that you kill. Re­
call that in her dismissal of dolus eventualis, 
Masipa argued that Pistorius could not 
‘reasonably have foreseen’ that the shots he 
fired could kill ‘the person behind the door, 
let alone the deceased, as he thought she 
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was in the bedroom at the time.’ And yet, 
finding him guilty of culpable homicide, 
she asked: ‘Would a reasonable person in 
the same circumstances as the accused have 
foreseen the possibility that, if he fired four 
shots at the door of the toilet, whoever was 
behind the door might be struck by a bullet 
and die as a result? Would a reasonable per­
son have taken steps to guard against that 
possibility? The answer to both questions 
is yes.’ This is reason straining at its own 
leash: the accused could not reasonably 
have foreseen the death of the deceased, yet 
a reasonable person would have taken steps 
to guard against the death of the person 
behind the door. Who is this reasonable 
person? If Masipa was wrong – and it will be 
clear by now that I think she was on this 
issue – it might be because the law can’t 
take full measure of the human complex­
ities to which we, unreasonably, expect it 
to be equal. It might also be because its 
category of reason, not least in the realm 
of violent crime, is a shape­changer. ‘The 
reasonable man,’ Masipa observed in a 
cit ation from a preceding judgment, ‘of 
course evolves with the times. What was 
reasonable in 1933 would not necessarily 
be reasonable today.’ 
There is also an issue of language in­
volved, as the attribution of guilt hangs 
on the finest linguistic discriminations, in 
particular on auxiliary verbs. Some exam­
ples: ‘I am not persuaded that a reasonable 
person with the accused’s disabilities in the 
same circumstances would have fired four 
shots into that small toilet cubicle.’ Crim­
inal liability is attributed according to 
whether ‘he ought to have foreseen the 
reasonable possibility of resultant death.’ 
The court, Masipa commented, citing an­
other preceding judgment, ‘should guard 
against proceeding from “ought to have fore­
seen” to “must have foreseen” and thence to 
“by necessary inference in fact foresaw” 
the possible consequences of the conduct 
being inquired into.’ The inference of ‘sub­
jective foresight cannot be drawn if there is 
a reasonable possibility that the accused 
did not foresee, even if he ought reasonably 
to have done so and even if he probably did 
so.’ At which point, we appear to have 
entered the world of that first great exper­
imental novel, Tristram Shandy. How, asks 
Tristram’s Uncle Toby, can someone speak 
about a white bear if he never saw one? 
Whereupon Tristram’s father produces this 
paean to the auxiliary verb and its power to 
conjure what isn’t there:
a WHite bear! Very well. Have I ever seen 
one? Might I ever have seen one? Am I ever to 
see one. Ought I ever to have seen one? Or can 
I ever see one?
Would I have seen a white bear (for how 
can I imagine it?)
If I should see a white bear, what should I 
say? If I should never see a white bear, what 
then?
If I never have, can, must or shall see a 
white bear alive; have I ever seen the skin of 
one? Did I ever see one painted? – described? 
Have I never dreamed of one?
Did my father, mother, uncle, aunt, broth­
ers or sisters, ever see a white bear? What 
would they give? How would they behave? 
How would the white bear have behaved? Is 
he wild? Tame? Rough? Smooth?
Is the white bear worth seeing? 
Is there no sin in it?
Is it better than a blacK oNe?
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This is language as speculative decay, losing 
its grip on reality which – as we have known 
since Saussure (and Sterne) – it has never 
had anyway.
‘What is this irrational fear that has sunk deep into the psyche?’ Margie Orford asked. 
Let’s return to the subject of bathrooms. 
After all, it isn’t just in the South African 
imagination that they are the scene of the 
crime – the shower scene in Psycho most 
obviously comes to mind. In one famous 
passage in Proust, the narrator – at no small 
physical risk  – hoists himself onto a ladder 
and peers through a fanlight into the 
shop into which the Baron de Charlus and 
the tailor Jupien have disappeared after a 
mutual seduction in the courtyard. There 
he hears sounds so violent that ‘had they 
not constantly been taken up an octave 
higher by a parallel moaning, I might have 
thought that one person was slitting an­
other’s throat close beside me, and that the 
murderer and his resuscitated victim were 
then taking a bath to wash away the traces 
of the crime.’ A bathroom is a place of pur­
ity and danger. Not just the scene of a 
killing, but the first place you go in order to 
wash away the traces of the crime.  
In Western culture bathrooms are places 
where we submit the roughage of our inner 
and outer worlds to the regimen of the con­
trolled and the clean. ‘There is no denying 
the cleanliness,’ Junichirō Tanizaki laments 
of the Western toilet in his 1977 meditation 
In Praise of Shadows, ‘every nook and corner 
is pure white.’ Yet ‘the cleanliness of what 
can be seen only calls up the more clearly 
thoughts of what cannot be seen . . . I sup­
pose I shall sound terribly defensive,’ he 
continues, ‘if I say that Westerners attempt 
to expose every speck of grime and erad­
icate it, while we Orientals carefully pre­
serve and even idealise it.’ In Purity and 
Danger (the first and still the last word on 
these matters), Mary Douglas writes about 
the Nyakyusa, who ‘venerate their own de­
tritus and sweep rubbish onto mourners, 
their ritual of mourning being to welcome 
filth’. An obsessional culture on the other 
hand – Western culture – is guilty, un­
settled in the discriminations it most earn­
estly wishes to police (the distinction be­
tween men and women, or between black 
and white). As Douglas also points out, it is 
only around norms and behaviours that are 
contradictory or unstable – for instance, 
the attempt to subordinate women in a 
cult ure which partly recognises their auto­
nomy as human – that pollution fears tend 
to cluster, and they are rarely independent of 
sex (she gives the example of the husband 
‘needing to be convinced of his own masc­
ulinity and of the dangers thereof ’).  In the 
case of Pistorius, it wasn’t just his body – ‘I 
beat my body and make it my slave’ – 
but also his mind that he wanted to sub­
ordinate: ‘Every race is won or lost in the 
head, so you have to get the contents of 
your head right,’ he responded to a question 
about his obsessional note­taking in an 
interview with the Financial Times. ‘Writing 
things down helps you to control your 
thoughts.’  
But there is a limit to such control. When 
Mark Gevisser was attacked in a private 
home with two close women friends, he 
18   6 November 2015
started by believing their lives were saved 
by the respect they paid to the black intrud­
ers. But then he came to see things rather 
differently: ‘You have no control over what 
will happen to you. It is random and it is 
chaotic, and even if your reasonable be­
haviour lessens the odds of your being hurt 
or killed, it guarantees you nothing. You 
have no control over when, and how, you 
will die. Once you understand this, you ac­
cept that life is a gift.’ This is the opposite 
of obsessional thought, which, as Freud 
puts it, endlessly returns to ‘those subjects 
upon which all mankind are uncertain and 
upon which our knowledge and judgment 
must necessarily remain open to doubt’ – a 
form of thought which can’t bear human 
ambi valence. On this, Gevisser’s story is 
exemplary. He felt genuine empathy with 
his intruders, but that didn’t stop him pur­
suing one of them to court, a Zimbabwean 
migrant whose story of barely surviving in 
the city he writes about with the utmost 
care. But he also hates him: ‘I hated him for 
having made me hateful and I hated myself 
for hating him.’ This tale bookends Lost and 
Found in Johannesburg and its complexity is 
surely the perfect counterfoil to the idea 
that the only way to deal with an intruder in 
today’s South Africa is to shoot four times 
through a locked door. 
More than twenty years after the end of 
apartheid, South Africa is riddled with 
violence, still suffering the legacy of its 
history, ‘the unfinished business buried in 
the South African body politic’, which the 
Paralympic hero Oscar Pistorius was called 
on to help the nation deny and transcend. 
We could say that it was his tragedy, al­
though far more the tragedy of Reeva 
Steenkamp, that, prey to a fantasy of omni­
potence in which the whole world colluded, 
he tried to take control of whatever he 
could: his body, his mind, his women, his 
guns. If there is a lesson I take from all 
this, it is that we should not expel our own 
hatreds in a futile effort to make ourselves, 
to make the world, clean. ‘The dark hole in 
the floor,’ Rebecca West observes of a toilet 
in old Serbia on her extraordinary 1930s 
journey through Yugoslavia, ‘made it seem 
as if dung, having been expelled by man, 
had set itself up as a new and hostile and 
magically powerful element that could cover 
the whole earth.’ Expelling dirt is as self­ 
defeating as it is murderous. Someone – a 
race, a sex – has to take the rap. c
